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The Order to Treat: Judicial Intervention
in Benign Neglect of Defective Infants
Dennis J. Horan and Marianne E. Guerrini

Mr. Horan, a Chicago attorney, specializes in the law which concerns the patient-physician relationship. He teaches medical-legal law
at the University of Chicago Graduate School in the Hospital Administration program. He lists the relationship of morality to law as one of
his prime interests and he and his associate, Marianne E. Guerrini,
both members of the same legal firm, collaborated on the following
article.
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Recent years have seen a strong upsurge in articles, speeches and
other discussions of a special form of euthanasia: benign neglect of
defective infants. Characterizing the lack of earlier discussion as a
"public and professional silence on a major social taboo," 1 Doctors
Raymond S. Duff and A. G. M. Campbell shattered this silence in a
1973 article outlining 43 cases of withholding treatment of defective
infants at a major university medical center. This began a flood of
discussion which has reached from U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings 2 to articles in both legal 3 and medical periodicals. 4 While there
has also been a concurrent discussion of the legal implications of
failure to treat a defective infant, only recently have the courts
stepped in to clear up speculation and declare in no uncertain terms
what the duty of hospitals and physicians is with regard to the care of
a child born with a birth defect that is capable of treatment. 5
This paper will focus on two recent cases that stand for the proposition that the medical profession has a duty to treat the defective
child, even in the face of parental refusal to consent to treatment. This
is an aspect of euthanasia of defective infants that has received frighteningly little attention in the medical community. In their article in
the New England Journal of Medicine in 1973,6 Professors Duff and
Campbell speak of 43 cases related to withholding treatment of
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defective children, including fifteen multiple anomalies, eight
trisomies, eight cardiopulmonary diseases, seven meningomyeloceles,
three central nervous system disorders and two short bowel
syndromes. In each case the decision was made not to treat and the
child died. Duff and Campbell conclude their paper with the observation: "If working out these [moral and ethical] dilemmas in ways
such as those we suggest [withholding treatment and giving only sedation plus water sufficient to slake thirst] is in violation of the law, we
believe the law should be changed." 7 They totally fail to discuss the
fact that their suggestion is in clear violation of the law as it now stands
in every state of this country.
We must make it clear that there is a very necessary distinction of
whether we are talking about a treatable or non-treatable case .. Where
there is no treatment available for a specific defect, the law does not
require the physician to treat the hopeless. The law does not require
useless acts by the physician; the standard of care requires only that
he exercise that degree of care and skill of ordinarily well-qualified
physicians. Thus, in the truly terminal case of the newborn who will
die regardless of what ordinary or extraordinary means are employed,
questions of potential criminal and civil liabilities surrounding withdrawal of treatment do not arise. Nor does withdrawal of treatment
under those circumstances constitute abandonment of a patient. What
we see there is the exercise of sound medical judgment based upon
purely medical (not social) factors, such as expected outcome' and
prognosis.
The picture changes radically when we are discussing treatable cases
where the prognosis is or may be guarded, but nevertheless an acceptable form of medical intervention exists which will correct the current
condition of ill-being, which otherwise would cause death.
We find this type of "classic" case arising time after time in literature, both legal and ethical. Returning to Duff and Campbell's first
dicussion of their cases, we note the following example:
An infant with Down's Syndrome and intestinal atresia, like the much
publicized one at Johns Hopkins Hospital was not treated because his
parents thought that surgery was wrong for th eir baby and themselves. He
died several days after birth. 8

'/

In the Johns Hopkins case referred to, which was reported in a film by
the Kennedy Foundation made several years after the occurrence, the
child lived for 15 days after the decision was made. 9
These cases bring up the question of potential legal liability for
parents, physicians and, for that matter, anyone else involved in the
denial of treatment to these children. Law professor John Robertson
has done a comprehensive legal analysis of withholding care from the
defective newborn. 1o Commenting on the Duff and Campbell paper,
Robertson points out how surprising it is that there is no discussion,
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and no indication that the parents have been informed of the legal
rights and obligations surrounding these decision-making problems and
the infant's death as a possible solution. Robertson finds potential
criminal liability for the parents as the result of such a decision. All of
the conditions are met for homicide by omission: first, the omission
of a legal duty to protect another which the parent owes to the child;
second, a willful (i.e. , knowing) failure to act with knowledge of the
probable result - withdrawal of treatment which will result in death;
and third, that the failure or omission is the probable cause of the
child's death. If the failure to act (provide treatment) is intentional,
the result could be first or second degree murder. If the state of mind
of the people involved in the decision-making process is such that they
are incapable of making a rational decision, it could be classified as
gross negligence resulting in involuntary manslaughter. 11
One involved in a decision-making process of this sort must always
keep foremost the reality that the born child is a person under the law
and has the same rights under the Constitution and criminal laws of
this country. The fact that the child may be profoundly retarded or
have myriad physical problems does not in any way diminish that
child's rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently emphasized that
those with mental impairments are accorded the same protection as
any other person under the law. 12
This is particularly important for the physician to remember. For
purposes of this discussion, we will not consider further the question
of potential civil and criminal liabilities of parents who refuse to give
consent to treatment of a defective infant. Whatever the parents' situation, the courts have now recognized both a right and a duty on the
part of anyone involved in the care of a defective child to render such
treatment as is medically appropriate, whether or not that child is
defective.
Ruling on Parental Inaction
In Application of Cicero, J3 a New York trial court ruled that
parental inaction may not be allowed to deny treatment to a defective
child. The case involved a child who was born with a meningomyelocele, a relatively low spinal lesion. Treatment by surgery would
probably still leave the child with a permanent impairment of her legs
below the ankle, as well as inability to control bowel or bladder.
Without surgery, death was almost a certainty. The parents refused
to consent to surgery and insisted that the child be released to
their care and to "let God decide" as to the child's fate. The chief
executive officer of the hospital petitioned the court to be appointed
the child's guardian for the limited purpose of consenting to the
surgery. The court rejected the parents' argument that granting the

44

Linacre Quarterly

doctor's petition would infringe upon their parental rights to decide
the treatment, upbringing and welfare of their child, stating:
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Parental rights, however, are not absolute. Children are not property whose
disposition is left to parental discretion without hindrance. [Cites omitted]
Where the child's welfare demands judicial intervention, this court is
empowered to intervene. [Cite omitted.] Certainly, every physician who
prefers a course of treatment rejected by a parent is not privileged to have
the court decide upon the treatment under its parens patriae powers [Cites
omitted . ] But where, as h ere, a child has a reasonable chance to live a
useful, fulfilled li fe, the court will not permit parental inaction to deny that
chance. 14

The Cicero decision goes one step beyond an earlier decision by the
same court which had emphasized the rights of a mentally "defective"
person to surgery to correct. a physical defect. In Re Weberlistl 5 had
earlier held that a mental hospital would be empowered to consent on
behalf of a retarded patient to surgery to correct a cleft palate and
other physical defects. The case emphasized the patient's right to
treatment which was available to correct physical problems, even
though nothing could be done to change his mental status. Weberlist
involved a situation where the parents could not be located and thus
the decision does not have the impact of Cicero.
The Cicero case is crucial because it outlines the duty and responsibility of a physician to seek judicial intervention to protect the rights
of a defective infant where the parents have refused to consent to
treatment. Although courts had earlier ordered blood transfusions for
children of Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, this is one of the few
reported decisions in which the situation has arisen in the court where
treatment was sought on behalf of a defective child.
The implications of this decision cannot be ignored by the medical
profession. The physician and hospital have a duty to the child apart
from any duty that the parents hold. This responsibility is contractual
in nature and has been held to arise whether express or implied. 16 The
physician and hospital agreed to the rendition of medical services for
the benefit of the mother and the born child and the parents agreed to
pay for them. When the parents withhold treatment, the issue as to
consent to treatment for the child arises. The key point is that the
refusal of parental consent in these circumstances does not extinguish
the physician's or the hospital's obligation to continue to act on
behalf of the child. 17 At least one other commentator has pointed out
that the child is a third-party beneficiary of any contract between the
parents and hospital or physician and, as such, the parents and
hospital or physician cannot unilaterally cut off the child's rights. 18
In addition to the criminal liability which may arise 19 (and this is a
more real concern to the physician than the hospital since it is very
unlikely that criminal charges will be brought against a hospital or
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other institution), another area of the law which we refer to as tort
law or personal injury law, is applicable to this situation. In tort law,
failure to treat can amount to the commission of a willful or intentional tort, a negligent omission, or abandonment of the child. 2o The
fact that the parents have consented to withdraw treatment does not
protect the physician and hospital. The statement that "the parents
wouldn't give consent" would be no defense to a lawsuit for money
damages brought by a third party as a result of the child's death.
Potential criminal and civil liability arising from the physician and
hospital's independent duties to the defective child (that is, independent of any duty owed the child by its parents) do vary from that
duty owed to the healthy, "normal" child. The dilemma for the
physician and hospital really only begins when the parents refuse to
consent to treatment. At that point the duty to the child must. be
recognized as independent from any consideration of the desires and
wishes of the parents. How should the physician then conduct
himself? His field is medicine; his expertise is in the area of medical
judgment. When, in the exercise of sound medical judgment based
upon the child 's condition, he or she makes a judgment as to whether
or not medical treatment should be withheld, the physician is acting in
a safe, sound and secur~ manner within the limits of the law. When
judgments are made which transcend medical judgment, when he or
she in effect determines that for social reasons (family situation,
"quality of life," etc.) that some should live and some die, the
physician has crossed the boundaries of the law. Where parental consent is withheld, the physician must obey the mandate of the Cicero
court to seek state intervention to make those decisions that are
beyond the physician's area of expertise and right.
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